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1950 DIRECTIVE OF NORTH VIETNAM COMMUNIST PARTY
ON CORRECTION OF ERRORS IN RURAL POLICY

[Comment: The following is the full text of a directive issued in 1950 on the correction of errors and weaknesses in the rural policy of the Communist party in North Vietnam. (The official name of the party, adopted later, is the Lao Dong Party.) The directive, No 37/CT/TU, was approved on 5 November 1950 by the Standing Committee of the party's Central Committee, and was published in Ha Dong by the Ha Dong Agricultural Association in 1952 as a pamphlet titled Sua Chua Sai Lam Trong Viec Thi Hanh Chinh Sach Nong Thon.]

A. Errors and Weaknesses

Many grave errors and omissions in the party's rural policy and program have recently been committed by the Party Group in the Central Committee of the Association of Peasants for National Salvation, by a number of comrades on the Central Economic Committee, and by many party committee echelons in all regions. The errors and weaknesses are as follows:

1. The rent reduction policy is not being applied strictly to the landlord class, as should be the case. The identical rent reduction program is being applied to rich peasants as well. In Thua Thien Province, slogans have appeared against middle-class peasants in order to "complete rent reduction." The slogan, "Exceed Rent Reduction Goals" became popular in Phu Tho and Tuyen Quang provinces. The Party Group in the Central Committee of the Association of Peasants for National Salvation forced the landlords to make rent reduction retroactive to the 10th-month crop of 1949. In Interzone Five, rent reduction was interpreted to mean that "the rich and the poor help each other."

Political pressure, threats, and unilateral actions are being used to implement rent reduction instead of movements, explanations, and persuasion. To demand that the landowners enact rent reduction by threatening them before attempting explanations is an excessively leftist approach. Demonstrating against the landlords, inciting mass movements to abandon land, postponing rent payments, and removing land markers does not aid rent reduction or help consolidate the Association of Peasants for National Salvation. On the contrary, in Nghe An Province such a policy caused schisms within the association which worked to the landlords' advantage. Tenant farmers in Phu Tho Province were intimidated by the threat that "whoever does not struggle now will not be buried when he dies" or "if your house burns no one will extinguish the blaze."

On the other hand, in some places a complacent attitude exists toward the landlords. Some landlords are Lien Viet members or government employees. A lax attitude also exists in regard to the Catholic landlords and missions in Interzones Three and Four.

In many places the debt interest reduction is not highly regarded and serious investigations are not being made. As a result, great difficulty has arisen in executing a precise policy. In Tuyen Quang Province, the policy of agitating among needy farmers to demand a re-examination of all contracts made in the last few decades caused disquietude among the landowners.

2. The movement to donate rice land in many places is not considered in conjunction with the other policies to promote the resistance. Therefore, the movement is not aimed solely at the landlords, but the middle-class or poor peasants are also urged to give up land or crops. In some areas, it is not realized that the landlords should only offer fertile fields, and barren or marginal lands are being accepted instead. Landlords in such areas as Interzones Three and Four, and Viet Bac Interzone have tried to repossess fields donated to the authorities. The use of these fields has not always been in the best interests of the tenant farmers and the nation.

3. The division of communal lands has also been incorrectly implemented. The Party Group in the Central Committee of the Association of Peasants for National Salvation has not only refused to allow landlords and rich peasants to share in these lands but has also demanded that the middle-class peasant cede his rightful portion. In Interzone Four and Viet Bac Interzone an oppressive policy of centralizing all semi-public rice lands has been instituted. In Thanh Hoa Province even the land cleared by needy peasants was centralized. Other areas were more interested in reselling the land to obtain public funds than in dividing the lands for the benefit of the peasants. Besides, a number of chi-bo even appropriated some of the funds obtained for their private use and in Thieu Hoa and Thanh Hoa provinces perpetrated fraud in the division of the lands, thus causing loss of prestige for the party.

4. A gross misinterpretation has arisen concerning the policy of temporarily distributing rice lands which formerly belonged to the French or Vietnamese traitors. Comrades have been granting the peasants permanent ownership of these lands instead of mere temporary claims on the pretext that temporary ownership would not satisfy the peasants or induce them to produce ardently. This policy was advocated by the Party Group on the Central Committee of the Association of Peasants for National Salvation, a few comrades on the Central Economic Committee, and a number of party members in Nam Bo. In many places, the cadres view these grants as a favor to the peasants rather than as their rightful rewards of victory. Some cadres are not relying on the opinions of the masses in distributing these lands. The lack of sound investigation and concrete planning has caused the people to become disheartened about the policy. In a few places, the needy farmers did not even insist on the distribution of these fields. In Bac Giang and Vinh Yen provinces, the tenant farmers registered many complaints about the execution of this program.

5. Major errors have also been committed in the program of establishing work exchange teams and agricultural producer cooperatives. A number of comrades on the Central Economic Committee have evoked a policy of not allowing the rich peasants to join these organizations because they fear that the rich peasants' interests will not coincide with those of the masses. Several places in Viet Bac Interzone have forced needy farmers to relinquish temporarily distributed rice lands so that cooperatives could be established there. Particularly in Thanh Hoa and Nghe An provinces, a misconception has arisen in regard to the work exchange teams. It is not understood that their express aim is to increase production in order to improve the people's livelihood and to supply the front lines. The policies of the cooperatives or workers' groups in fixing wages or dividing produce often exhibit favoritism toward either the poor farmers or the landowners which only adds difficulties to the development of these groups.

6. It is not precisely understood that in the general mobilization of the rural villages we must mobilize all areas at all times in order to supply the needs of the resistance. The mobilization lacks planning, investigation, careful preparation, and inspection. This is particularly true in Interzone Five and several provinces in Interzone Four. Some places in Interzone Five interpreted general mobilization to mean a campaign to balance the budget, while some cadres in Interzone Four distorted the policy to dogmatically force the people to hand over money and possessions.

7. In consolidating the Association of Peasants for National Salvation, the party group in this organization has adopted the policy of excluding the rich peasants. The vice-chairman of the Central Economic Committee decided to allow the rich peasants to join the Association of Peasants for National Salvation but established a "middle-class and poor peasant group" so that the classes could be indoctrinated differently.

8. In carrying out agricultural reforms in the mountainous and minority areas, the same techniques used in the low regions for implementing rent reduction are being applied. The lack of planning, explanation, organization, and leadership has caused discontent among the people.

B. Causes of These Errors and Weaknesses

The weaknesses and errors described above, which have considerably harmed the implementation of the party's rural policy, are principally leftist in character. They have occurred because the lower echelons are working under the following misconceptions:

1. They regard lightly the policy of uniting the people for a long-term resistance. Because of that, a tendency toward a "worker-farmer doctrine" has arisen in which only the narrow interests of the farmers and workers are considered. By expecting a rapid victory, errors were committed in the general mobilization and the general counteroffensive. The slogan "Everything for the front; everything for victory" has been misinterpreted as meaning an all-out effort for a rapid victory.

2. The lower echelons do not clearly understand the revolutionary strategy and tactics concerning each rural class. As a result, many misconceptions exist concerning the cadres' attitudes toward landlords and the rich, middle-class, and poor peasants.

3. In executing the land policy, the over-aim of developing production to improve living standards and to supply the needs of the resistance is not understood by all cadres.

4. The cadres often disregard persuasion in deference to coercion in carrying out the party's rural policy. Since they do not realize the importance of persuasion, subjectivity, dogmatism, and bureaucracy are still widespread.

5. The party committee echelons do not see the need of thorough training and education in the party's land policy for all party members and members of the Association of Peasants for National Salvation. The lack of indoctrination, education, and consolidation on the lower level is very evident.

6. The party committee echelons have not yet placed particular attention on the agricultural movement and have not closely led rural activities. Lack of liaison has existed between the Association of Peasants for National Salvation, the civil authorities, and the party committees.

7. In many areas, the party committee echelons, resistance administrative committees, civil authorities in charge of rural activities, and various executive organs of the groups are still composed of many rich peasants and influential landlords. As a result, the leaders had a tendency to establish either a rightist policy which benefited their own interests of a leftist program which attempted to mollify the population.

Despite the Central Committee's careful delineation of the rural and general mobilization policies, these programs have not been fully popularized within the party. On the other hand, the Central Committee has conducted very few reviews, investigations, or recapitulations and has had to remedy many leadership weaknesses of its own.

C. Policy on Different Classes in Rural Villages

The rural policy of the party at this time must be based on the revolutionary strategy of the party, and the attitudes of all rural echelons must express this policy. Comrade Truong Chinh set forth this policy at the enlarged meeting of the Central Economic Committee held 5-7 July 1950. The principal points of the rural strategy of the party are outlined below.

During this period, the essential contradiction which must be resolved immediately in Vietnam is that between nationalism and the imperialism of the French colonialists, American interventionists, and their Vietnamese lackeys who oppose our freedom and independence. Thus, at this time the interests of each class must be subordinated to the interests of the national resistance. Of our two tasks, anti-imperialism and antifeudalism, anti-imperialism is the principal one today. The party program is to unite all peoples and every force in the great revolution against the imperialists and their lackeys. Because of this, during the revolutionary period, our party program will be: To unify all peasants (including the rich peasants), limiting our pressure to the landlords, in order to defeat the imperialist invader, establish independence, and truly consolidate the people's democratic authority.

The strategy of the party concerning the peasants is to rely on the tenants and poor peasants, achieve a close alliance with the middle-class peasants, collaborate with the rich peasants, and at the same time bring the landlords into the resistance. We should absolutely not equate the landlord with the imperialist, or the rich peasant with the landlord, or the middle-class peasant with the rich peasant.

In regard to the landlords, party policy should not push them over to the imperialist side but should mobilize them to support the resistance or at least to maintain strict neutrality. Thus, during this stage of the revolution, the party recognizes their property rights and personal rights (Political rights such as the privilege of running for office, voting privileges, and freedom of discussion). Nevertheless, rent and interest reduction must be implemented to limit the robbery which is inherent in their feudal nature. Persuasion and coercion should be used to implement these programs but the primary method should be persuasion by the Lien Viet Front. This group should explain to the landlords that for the sake of the resistance they must make a few concessions to the peasants and laboring class so that the latter classes will make a greater contribution to the war effort.

The party policy at the present is to cooperate with the rich peasants in order to further the resistance and expand agricultural production. Generally speaking, the rich peasants and the national capitalists possess an anti-imperialist attitude and they also represent a rather important segment of our economy. For this reason, we must mobilize, persuade, educate, and reform this class. The Association of Peasants for National Salvation must persuade and negotiate with the rich peasants so that they will voluntarily share some of their assets with the poorer farmers. But compulsion must be used against the more stubborn elements.

The party must form a close alliance with the middle-class peasants. The middle-class peasants, as well as the petty bourgeoisie, have clearly exhibited an ardent revolutionary and resistance spirit. All classes of workers should recognize the middle-class peasants as allies in the present struggle. This class is playing a central role in production and in the cooperatives, as well as in government and front activities. Therefore, we must not collide with any of their economic interests, but on the contrary must constantly improve their livelihood and help them increase production. We must prevent or conciliate any conflicts between the middle-class peasants and the masses so that all these groups will become more closely united. Even though the middle-class peasants are not proletarians, no opposition to this class should develop.

On the other hand, we must remember that, because of their economic position, the middle-class peasants have a tendency to shirk their duties and exploit the lower classes. At the same time they possess property which is coveted by the upper classes. Thus, while maintaining a close alliance with the middle-class peasants we must patiently indoctrinate, educate, and reform them.

Today, the assertion that the rich peasant can be equated with the landlord, or the middle-class peasant with the rich peasant, is completely erroneous. The above strategy concerning the various agricultural classes must be applied in implementing the party's rural policy and program.

D. Purpose and Methods of Corrections

All localities urgently need to correct their rural policies in the following manner:

1. Rent and Interest Reduction

The express target of rent and interest reduction is the landlord alone, not the landlord and the rich peasant. In accordance with the decrees, decisions, and communiques, we must carry out a rent reduction of 25 percent except in extraordinary cases where landlords have been charging excessively high or excessively low rents. We must persuade the landlords to reduce their rents agreeably and should teach the tenants to demand only their just due. Both persuasion and compulsion can be used to establish the program but compulsion should not include any physical force or any means likely to harm the resistance. The civil authorities, therefore, should clearly explain these decrees to everyone in rent and interest reduction meetings and intervene only in those cases which are not completely settled. The stubborn landlords should be punished strictly according to government decree.

In areas where there are both upper and middle-class landlords, the movement should be aimed at the former group first. Even Catholic landlords and missions and landlords who are members of the Lien Viet must be persuaded or compelled to reduce rents and interest.

Rich peasants who have oppressed the peasants must be clearly persuaded to reduce rent and interest, but a mass struggle or government pressure against them should be avoided.

In regard to middle-class peasants who have instituted oppressive land rents, a 25-percent reduction should not be rejected if it is offered, but the negotiations should be carried on within the organization of the Association of Peasants for National Salvation or directly between the persons involved. Even though the tenant farmer may rent from the middle-class peasant, the principal aim is not to force rent reduction but to encourage greater mutual aid.

In the Catholic regions, it is necessary to alert and mobilize the Catholic populace to reduce rents voluntarily. The use of persuasion on the clergy should be strictly secondary.

We must carry out rent and interest reduction in the newly liberated areas according to general precepts, but in some cases it will be necessary to focus primary attention on quieting and unifying the people, such as in areas where thorough investigations have not been conducted or where the populace has not yet been organized. In these areas haste would only bring failure.

In regions temporarily occupied by the enemy, the strengths and weaknesses of the mass movement must be taken into account, and rent reduction should be applied only where it would not harm the resistance policy.

All echelons of the party and the Association of Peasants for National Salvation must expose all plots used by the landlords and help the tenants to oppose these plots. The civil authorities must help both the landlords and the tenants to carry out their obligations; i.e., the landlord must reduce the rent and the tenant must pay the correct rent after it has been reduced.

One rule that must be observed is that rent reduction should not be forced on the landlords until after the mass movement has begun. Otherwise, stubborn opposition is likely to arise which would harm the primary object of unifying for the resistance. Interest reduction applies only to those debts in effect before the signing of the decree.

The problem of repurchasing lands sold during the disaster period 1944-1945 requires serious study, and therefore a general policy cannot be adopted in regard to this problem.

To overcome the existing errors, the interzone committees must thoroughly investigate the conditions in their areas and make proposals to the Central Committee. Also, the Central Committee must send persons to a number of localities to investigate, study, and adopt procedures for executing the law.

While executing the decree, constant vigilance is required to protect the tenant's planting rights, particularly after the rent reduction. Even in areas where this decree has not yet been applied, adequate machinery should exist to supervise rent payments and the division of rice land. When contracts between the landlords and tenants are registered, the Association of Peasants for National Salvation must explain the contract obligations to both sides. If the landlord is a middle-class peasant, particularly a low middle-class peasant, or if the tenant family has several members in the army, government organs, or other groups, special dispensation should be made. Under these circumstances, mutual aid should be undertaken.

2. Movement to Donate Land

The principal aim of the party's rural policy at present is to achieve a reduction of rents and interest. The movement to donate land must not be regarded as a primary objective, but on the other hand we must not completely neglect this work. The aim of the land donation movement is to allow the landlord by his own authority to reduce his oppression by offering land for government use. This method offers the landlords a way to progress and reform and therefore should be a positive movement in which the landlords offer only fertile land to the government.

At present, the party is encouraging the rich peasants to participate positively in production and therefore does not advocate that they restrict their rice area. This applies even to the upper-rich peasants. But we should not attempt to stop honest rich peasants who wish to offer land.

Since our party wishes the middle-class and poor peasants to have additional land, this policy would not apply to them. Any land offered by the middle-class or poor peasants should be returned to them, except in cases where they wish to change occupations.

It is necessary to regulate the use of this transferred land sensibly in order to ensure continued production. Donated land which is now being cultivated by tenants must continue to be cultivated by them but the rent should be lighter than that paid to the former landowner. Donated lands not farmed by tenants should be entrusted to producer collectives or to poor farmers who should pay less than the average rent in that locality.

All transferred lands become national property, and therefore the localities may not purchase, retain, or sell this land. Rent collected from these lands must be used according to government regulation.

3. Distribution of Communal Lands

The communal lands must be used according to the following procedures:

a. These lands should be distributed among all workers, including landlords, who are 18 years or older (not 15 years or older as is the case in temporarily granting lands which formerly belonged to the enemy). The reason is that, according to our country's long-standing custom, 18 is the age at which a person "agrees to carry his share of the public welfare burden" and can profit from these lands. If the government at this time amends the decree to exclude landlords from sharing in these lands, the resistance policy would be adversely affected. By not abolishing the landlords' share of these lands we are not unilaterally violating their rights. Also, during the present resistance, our party policy is to guarantee the land rights of all landlords, and their interest in the communal lands is part of their legitimate land rights which we should not violate. We can, however, incite the landlords or upper-rich peasants to cede these lands willingly to poor farmers,

wounded veterans, or heroes' families, or to transfer them to the township treasury. Middle-class and poor peasants and artisans should not cede their share.

b. Communal lands should be redistributed within 3 or 5 years according to majority opinion in the township; the policy is thus not inflexible. The allocation is not to be for less than 3 years because the peasant needs this period to benefit from his improvements of the land.

c. The varied conditions in the localities must be taken into consideration when the lands are being distributed.

d. The communal lands must be distributed according to village units and not among the entire township because not all village lands are uniform and conflicts could easily arise. The township administrative resistance committees must distribute the communal lands of each village among the inhabitants within that village. (However, villages having a disproportionate amount of communal land should agree to allocate some land to neighboring villages within the township.)

e. It is possible to consign a portion of the communal lands to the township treasury, but the area should not be excessive and the action should be approved by the village populace. Some townships, particularly those having few communal lands, have difficulty obtaining public funds. In these cases, it is possible to levy a fair tax on the peasant or producer collectives which were given these lands, provided that they consent to the tax.

f. We should not at this time condemn all swindlers who misused communal lands in the past, because such a policy would produce more harm than good. Legal proceedings should be brought only against those outstanding culprits where positive proof exists.

g. The following procedures should be followed in regard to the semipublic lands:

Religious lands can be forced into the public treasury or divided among the people, but it is necessary to obtain the consent of the congregation and particularly of the church officials. The lands must not be unilaterally confiscated.

Public sites, and military, school, clan, and tribal lands should be voluntarily contributed for the public welfare. Household lands should not be divided but it is possible to encourage the households to entrust some of this land to the poorer members of the households.

Reclaimed land should not be included in the communal lands, and in places where this land has been taken over it should be returned to the peasants who reclaimed it. These peasants must cultivate this land under government regulation and in accordance with the slogan, "Do not reject a rod of uncultivated land."

4. Temporary Distribution of Lands Formerly Belonging to French and Vietnamese Traitors

The Central Committee's policy is to grant these lands to poor farmers temporarily and not permanently, because:

a. Property which has been abandoned by French or Vietnamese traitors becomes national property which the government can dispose of as it sees fit. Therefore, if persons who have been granted this land do not want to continue to cultivate it, they must return the land to the government for reassignment.

b. Temporary granting of this land is a subtle means of showing the peasants not only that land reform is possible but also that in the future they might be able to obtain even more land. On the other hand, some of this temporarily distributed land will probably have to be repossessed so that the government can establish national agricultural schools.

c. Permanent grants would have an adverse affect on the landlords because they would fear that their land would be divided also.

d. The decree specifies that these lands are granted for a period of at least 5 years, which allows the peasant to improve the land without hindering present production. In granting these lands, the party echelons must explain to the people the exact meaning of the word "temporary" so that they will not become discontented. It is also necessary to correct the erroneous thought that the bestowal of these fields is a beginning step in the confiscation of the landlords' property.

In enacting this program, we must correct the above-mentioned abuses, carefully investigate the land-tenancy situation, and increase the comprehension of the masses. The aim of this program is to mobilize the resistance spirit of the peasants and to increase production.

Note: The 10 percent levy on the produce from these fields is now being reexamined and the decision will be circulated later. [Footnote in source]: (Decree No 3 S. L. abolished this 10 percent tax on 6 February 1951, but it encouraged the people to voluntarily contribute some of the profits from these lands for the resistance.)

5. Development of Workers' Groups and Cooperatives

The agricultural producer cooperative movement can be expanded only if the following conditions exist:

The peasants must own their own land. Agricultural techniques must be improved, and arts and crafts must be developed so that the peasants will be supplied with the necessary equipment and supplies. The government must implement a fair land tax and price policy. The peasants should clearly realize the advantages of working in groups and should voluntarily participate in the cooperative movement.

Not all these conditions now exist. Therefore, simple forms of collaboration, such as work groups, and work exchange teams, should be popularized. Cooperatives should be organized only in areas where the appropriate conditions exist, such as in regions which possess many communal lands and where the middle-class peasants have been well-indoctrinated by the township chi-bo and the Association of Peasants for National Salvation. Peasants absolutely should not be forced to join cooperatives, because coercion only weakens the movement.

Most of the income (land rent) gained by the cooperative should be reserved by the cooperative but some should be returned to the members to engender enthusiasm for the movement. (The ration will be determined by the members at a cooperative meeting.) Newly established cooperatives, particularly, should make sizable distributions to their members.

The Central Committee has decided to allow rich peasants to join the work groups and cooperatives during this period, provided that they participate directly in the work, donate part of their income to the cooperative's treasury, and precisely follow the regulations of the cooperatives. However, the middle-class and poor peasants must hold the great majority of the seats on the governing committee and the party must firmly maintain control of the leadership. The governing committees of all work groups and cooperatives must develop a precise policy designed to increase production and improve the conditions of the peasants.

All echelons of civil authorities and the Association of Peasants for National Salvation have the following responsibilities in developing the producer cooperatives at present:

a. To investigate every aspect of the organization and work of the work groups, work exchange teams, and cooperatives. Every province or district will select one collective to be the focal point of the movement in that region. The training of agitation and administrative cadres for the cooperative and work groups must be in accordance with party principles and must utilize actual experiences.

b. To positively aid the collectives in improving techniques and the distribution of equipment and supplies.

6. Purchase of Paddy

The government has drawn up a graduated price index based on the interzone level for the purpose of purchasing rice. All interzones must purchase rice on the basis of this index and must still allow the peasants to sell some paddy on the open market. The localities are allowed to exceed this price index in purchasing rice only when rice is needed for the army and cannot be obtained in any other way. Regional authorities must publicly punish all persons who violate these rules.

In many places, the interzone and provincial committees have failed to regulate closely the marketing and distribution of rice. All party echelons must examine every phase of this work and make the proper readjustments. A system of disciplined reporting by all lower echelons must be established, and control cadres must be appointed to resolve any difficulties existing between the cadres and the people, as well as to correct any outstanding errors.

7. Participation of Rich Peasants in Association of Peasants for National Salvation

During this period, party policy is to allow rich peasants to participate in the Association of Peasants for National Salvation. Our present tactics are to collaborate with the rich peasants and to encourage them to expand production for the resistance and for national development. The express objective of rent and interest reduction is the landlord and not the rich peasant. Therefore, if we skillfully enlist the rich peasants into the Association of Peasants for National Salvation they will not constitute an obstacle to this program. On the other hand, if the rich peasants are not allowed to join the peasant group they are likely to form a bloc with the landlords opposed to rent and interest reduction.

The Association of Peasants for National Salvation must not limit its interests to the working peasants but should have regard for all peasants, including the rich peasants. In this way, all peasants will be mobilized for the resistance. Since the democratic people's authority is in the hands of the workers, we do not have to fear that the rich peasants will control the Association of Peasants for National Salvation. On the contrary, if the rich peasants are allowed to join the peasant group we will have many opportunities to indoctrinate and transform them. If the peasants attempt to enact erroneous rules, the association will punish them; and if the rich peasants carry on excessive activity within the organization, we can amend the regulations.

In recruiting rich peasants into the association we must take several precautions. The lower-rich peasants must be recruited before the upper-rich peasants. The rich peasants must clearly understand the aims, program, rules, and discipline of the association before being admitted as candidate members. Rich peasants can be elected executives of the association but they should occupy no more than 20 percent of the seats on the executive committee, and a rich peasant can never become secretary. The practice of recruiting rich peasants into the Association of Peasants for National Salvation, just like the name itself, is not to be permanent. When the revolution advances into another phase (the revolutionary period is not limited to the resistance period), the composition and the name of the organization will be changed.

8. Execution of Rural Policy in Mountainous Areas

The agricultural policy in the mountainous areas must be geared to the political awareness of the masses. In applying the policy we must seriously consider the modes and customs of the people and absolutely not destroy their faith. In the mountainous areas, as well as in the lowlands, the rural policy is aimed at unifying the resistance and developing production, and any program contrary to this aim must be avoided during this period of the struggle.

In any attempt to reduce or eliminate vestiges of feudalism in the minority regions, we must be certain that the majority of the masses are informed and positively support the reform. At the same time, it is necessary to convince those people exploiting the serfs that the change is needed. Every reform undertaken in the minority areas must have the prior approval of the Central Committee. Furthermore, the interzone committee must approve the detailed plan before it is put into operation, and every step along the way must be carefully guided.

9. Correction of Rural Work Methods

The rural policy of the party is very important because, in the long run, the vitality of the party will be judged by the capacity of the party to guide and influence the peasants in the rural areas. If the rural mission of the party is to advance, we must firmly implement the party's rural program, thoroughly investigate all conditions in the villages, and fully understand the peasants' aspirations. Bureaucracy, dogmatism, subjectivity, fear of difficulties and hardships, and haste -- all must be eliminated before the rural program will truly accomplish many results.

On the receipt of this important directive, the party apparatus must study every point, supervise its implementation in the localities, and immediately correct all errors and weaknesses. The popularization, control, and correction plan drawn up by the interzones and provinces implementing this

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directive must be fully circulated throughout the chi-bo and tieu-to (subparty units). The results must be fully reported to the interzone committee and from there forwarded to the Central Committee.

5 November 1950

Standing Committee of the Central Committee of the Party
Signed by Comrade Than

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